This paper examines the evolution of intra-financial sector lending in the United States, 1950States, -2012 presenting estimates constructed from the Federal Reserves Flow of Funds Accounts. We establish a number of stylized facts concerning the growth and composition of claims between financial institutions.
Introduction
Since the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007, economists and policy makers have expressed concern with the dangers posed by increased inter-connectedness among financial firms. Janet Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, for example, noted that "interconnections among financial intermediaries are not an unalloyed good. Complex interactions among market actors may serve to amplify existing market frictions, information asymmetries, or other externalities." 1 Her observation echoed those of other students of the financial crisis, including Jane DArista, who argued early on that the financial crisis of 2007 was precipitated by "a run on the financial sector by the financial sector" (D'Arista [8] ; Gorton and Metrick [14] ). Indeed, as early as 1993, Jane DArista and Tom Schlesinger had warned about the growth of a parallel banking system of non-bank financial institutions that were growing outside of the regulatory framework and were developing a thick web of inter-connected financial positions. By 2010, in identifying a "shadow banking system" economists at the New York Federal Reserve were describing in great detail a lengthening of the "credit chain" characterized by a sizeable amount of intra-financial lending. 2 A growing theoretical literature has attempted to model this phenomenon. Beginning with the seminal paper by Allen and Gale [3] , the early contributions to this literature examined the link between financial interconnectedness and financial instability, showing that greater interconnectedness generally led to a more robust financial system. 3 But more recent work reflects the darker side of inter-connectedness and its role in increasing financial instability (Shin [19] , Gai, et al. [13] , Upper [21] Acemoglu et al. [1] ).
In addition to concerns about financial instability associated with financial inter-connectedness, the Great Financial Crisis has raised questions about the social e ciency of the financial sector more generally. Prominent regulators, investors and economists have asked whether the financial system is "bloated", whether financial innovation contributes to social welfare, and whether, at the margin, more financial activity contributes to economic productivity or economic growth. (Volcker [22] ; Turner [20] ; Phillipon [17] ; Epstein and Crotty [11] ; Arcand, et. al. [4] ; Greenwood and Scharfstein [15] ; Bezemer [6] ).
The increased level of intra-financial lending that this paper identifies puts a number of these questions into sharp relief: What role does intra-financial lending play in the over-all economy? Does it contribute to economic growth, productivity growth? Is it socially beneficial? Or does it mostly reflect the shifting around of economic rents within the financial sector, while generating a web of counter-party risks that is dangerous?
As we will show, in the run-up to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, intra-financial lending comprised more than half of all financial sector lending. This was three times the share that characterized the so-called "golden age" period of rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Such a massive increase in such lending at a time of slower economic and productivity growth, during a time punctuated by major financial crises certainly raises questions about the social value of such lending. 1 Yellen [23] 2 See also DArista and Epstein [9] and Pozsar, et. al. [18] . 3 This literature is surveyed in Allen and Babus [2] . Other early contributions are Freixas et al. [12] and Dasgupta [10] .
Despite the importance of these issues, few empirical accounts of the growth of intra-financial claims exist. This is mainly because regulatory and statistical agencies currently do not collect data on intra-financial claims. Indeed, in 2011 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision formally recommended collecting data on intra-financial claims in order to better identify the "systemic impact of large banks, noting that this is likely positively related to its interconnectedness vis--vis other financial institutions." 4 To break through the data problems, we employ an approach developed by Bhatia and Bayoumi [7] , who showed that "the financial sectors vast expansion over 1980-2007 primarily reflected an explosion of claims between financial intermediaries." These authors utilized an approximation technique that we build on for our estimates and describe in detail below.
Our contribution in this paper is to provide a comprehensive account of these post-war trends in intrafinancial lending in the United States. With these data, researchers can study further the impact of intrafinancial lending on financial instability and the social e ciency of the financial sector (see Montecino and
Epstein [16] ).
While we are indebted to Bhatia and Bayoumi [7] for their estimation technique, our work di↵ers in several respects. First, we devote our attention exclusively to lending between financial institutions and look at both intra-financial lending flows and asset stocks. 5 Second, we estimate intra-financial lending and assets both including and excluding the Federal Reserve in order to get a clearer picture of the behavior of private financial institutions. The latter is especially important for understanding intra-financial activity during periods of financial turmoil. Finally, we decompose the growth of intra-financial lending into its major underlying financial instrument categories.
Our major findings are as follows: Intra-financial lending as a share of total financial sector lending appears to have grown nearly five fold since the 1950s. After averaging around a tenth of all lending throughout 1950-1980, lending between financial institutions now accounts for nearly half of all financial sector lending. The stock of intra-financial assets has followed a similar trend. These grew rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s and presently account for nearly 30 percent of all financial sector assets. Although the growth of intra-financial assets accelerated after 1980, the fastest increase took place between 1991 and the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001, increasing 10 percentage points from 15 to 25 percent of total financial sector assets.
Disaggregating our estimates into the underlying financial instruments, we also identify the main sources of increased lending between financial institutions. Increases in intra-financial lending during the 1980s and 1990s largely reflected developments in the money market, real estate-related credit, and growing holdings of bonds and securitized products issued by other financial institutions. However, during the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, the growth of intra-financial lending was primarily driven by investments in money market mutual funds (MMMFs), repurchase agreements, and securitization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the data and discusses 4 
BIS [5]
5 Bhatia and Bayoumi limited their analysis to asset stocks. 3 our methodology. The third section presents our baseline results while the fourth considers the e↵ects of excluding lending by the Federal Reserve from the calculations. The fifth section conducts a simple growth decomposition exercise to identify which financial instruments most contributed to intra-financial lending growth. The sixth and final section concludes by providing a broad overview of our results and suggesting future avenues for further research.
Data and Methodology
We use data from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FoF) of the Federal Reserve for the years 1950 to 2012 across 15 di↵erent financial instrument categories. The FoF is unparalleled in coverage and detail and o↵ers a comprehensive overview of financial transactions in the US economy. Data are available for multiple sectors of the US economy and at fine levels of disaggregation. Financial flows are also presented in terms of particular financial instruments. The FoF distinguishes between 28 general instrument categories, which are in turn disaggregated according to the type of financial institution holding each specific instrument.
Unfortunately, the FoF is not designed to capture financial flows between sectors or within a particular sector. In other words, the FoF does not have data on how much of lending by the financial sector directly represents lending to other financial institutions. To illustrate the problem, consider a simple balance sheet for the US economy. Let A s and L s stand for the total assets and liabilities, respectively, of sector s = f, n where f stands for the financial sector and n the nonfinancial sector, of a particular financial instrument.
The FoF provides data of the following form:
We can observe the total assets and liabilities of each sector in a particular instrument category but cannot directly observe how much of each instrument held as an asset by a given sector translates into liabilities for other sectors. That is, ideally we would observe:
Where a f f stands for the assets held by the financial sector that represent claims on other financial institutions. Hence, the problem is that a f f , our object of interest, is unobservable . We can approximate a f f by combining the two FoF series on sectors and instruments. A subset of the financial instruments contained in the FoF dataset can only appear on the liability side of the financial sector. This means that any assets of these instruments held by the financial sector are unambiguously claims on other financial institutions. We term these "unambiguous" instruments. These are: net interbank transactions, checkable deposits and currency, time and savings deposits, shares of MMMFs, mutual fund shares, open market paper, and federal funds and repurchase agreements. Together these six instruments makeup our narrow measure of intra-financial lending.
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The remaining instrument categories are murkier because they can appear on the liability side of both the financial and nonfinancial sectors. In other words, when one of these instruments appears on the asset side of the financial sector there is no direct way of knowing what sector holds it as a liability. We term these "grey area" instruments. The full list is: agency and GSE-backed securities, corporate and foreign bonds, corporate equities, loans not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), other loans and advances, total mortgages, trade credits, and security credits.
In order to unpack these grey area instruments we follow Bhatia and Bayoumi [7] in assuming fixed portfolio shares of each sector across instruments categories. Specifically, we assume financial sector claims on other financial institutions for each instrument reflect the sectors share of outstanding liabilities of that instrument. Let ↵ i stand for this share of instrument i. For all instruments i our assumption is that
where L f,i denotes the outstanding liabilities of instrument i held by the financial sector, S is the set of sectors s, and the denominator stands for the total outstanding liabilities of instrument i across all sectors. For example, when the financial sector holds corporate and foreign bonds, a fraction alpha of these assets constitute claims on other financial institutions. 6 Hence, although a f f is not directly observable, we approximate it for each year as the sum:
where I is the set of all grey area instruments and time subscripts have been omitted for notational ease.
We should note that this is obviously an unrealistic assumption and estimates in each instrument category might contain non-trivial biases. Nevertheless, there is no clear reason to expect the biases to be correlated across instruments and when the estimates for each instrument are aggregated some of the biases should cancel out, likely resulting in a reasonable approximation. As a check, we present below estimates based on an alternative method proposed by Greenwood and Scharfstein [15] that gives similar results.
We start by calculating ↵ i for all grey area instruments in each year for the period 1950-2012. Summary statistics and levels are shown in Table A order, open market and commercial paper, security credits, and agency and GSE-backed securities.
The next step is simply to multiply each corresponding ↵ i by the corresponding assets series for each instrument and every year. We do this for both stocks and flows. The final step is to sum each component 6 See the data appendix for more detail.
together to arrive at our estimate of grey area intra-financial sector lending. Together, the unambiguous and grey area instruments make up our extended measure of intra-financial sector lending.
Baseline Estimates
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows our baseline estimates of intra-financial lending in flows (as a percent of total financial sector lending in each year). The solid line shows the extended measure of intra-financial lending (grey area plus unambiguous instruments) while the dotted line shows the narrow measure, which consists of the unambiguous instruments alone. The narrow measure can be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of the share of intra-financial lending since the unambiguous instruments are those that can only be liabilities of the financial sector -that is, we know with certainty that ↵ i = 1.
The first thing to notice is that the share of intra-financial sector lending increased sharply during the (Table 1) . But this changed in the early 1980s as the share of intra-financial lending started growing rapidly.
Between 1980 and 1999 its share of total lending almost tripled. By 1999 nearly two-fifths of all financial sector lending represented lending to itself. Source: Authors' calculations based on the flow of funds.
In terms of stocks, intra-financial sector assets experienced a similar increase. These increased from 12 Two points follows from these estimates. First, in 2008 only around two-fifths of lending by the financial sector was to the real economy, raising questions about whether financial institutions were fulfilling their traditional role of mobilizing credit to businesses and financing long-term investment. Second, the data suggest that on the eve of the financial crisis interconnectedness between financial institutions had reached a historic high, potentially implying a major source of financial fragility. However, these figures should be interpreted with care. One reason is that they include lending by the Federal Reserve and therefore the estimates are skewed by the conduct of monetary policy, especially during periods of financial turmoil. In the next section we will estimate these same figures but will exclude lending by the Federal Reserve in order to get a clearer picture of the behavior of private financial institutions.
Finally, we conclude this section by comparing our baseline estimate to a related measure proposed by Greenwood and Scharfstein [15] . They propose a "credit intermediation index" (CII) intended to capture the average number of steps a dollar takes as it passes from households to the final end-users. Their CII is calculated as CII = total liabilities total liabilities financial sector liabilities (3) where the numerator contains the total liabilities of the economy while the denominator contains the liabilities of the non-financial sector. In other words, the CII is the ratio of the economys total liabilities to the liabilities of end-users of credit. Thus, an increase in the CII implies a lengthening of the intermediation chain and can be interpreted as a proxy for intra-financial lending. Figure 3 compares the CII for the US to our baseline estimate of the intra-financial assets share. As can be seen below, the two measures are broadly comparable and exhibit very similar trends throughout most of the sample (although the scales are not strictly comparable between the two measures) 7 . This provides a partial robustness check regarding the accuracy of our estimates. Source: Authors' calculations based on the flow of funds.
7 Our measure is a simple share of total financial sector assets while the CII measures the average number of steps in the credit intermediation chain.
4 Removing the Federal Reserve
In most cases removing the Federal Reserve from our estimates is fairly straightforward. On the asset side it simply involves identifying and subtracting Federal Reserve holdings from each appropriate instrument category, as well as subtracting total Federal Reserve assets from the total assets of the financial sector (for estimates of flows it involves doing the same but in terms of total lending instead of total assets). The liability side is trickier for two reasons. First, Federal Reserve liabilities need to be removed from the total liabilities of the financial sector in each instrument category in order to recalculate the share ↵ i of liabilities held by the financial sector. This is important because otherwise ↵ i would be biased upward, inflating our estimates of intra-financial lending.
Second, in the case of unambiguous instruments, it is now also necessary to account for financial sector and then multiply the financial sectors assets by (1 ↵ fed ). In the case of flows, we scaled the financial sectors lending by (1 ↵ fed ).
One implication of this procedure is that, strictly speaking, checkable deposits and currency can no longer be considered unambiguous intra-financial lending. In other words, before we knew with certainty that all financial sector lending in this instrument represented financial sector borrowing but once we start distinguishing between the financial sector and the Federal Reserve we need to make assumptions, as we did with the grey area instruments, concerning the proportions of these flows that become liabilities for the Federal Reserve. As a consequence, the general precision of our estimates decreases somewhat. and dramatic expansion of its balance sheet. Second, the share of intra-financial sector lending now appears to have not only fully recovered after the crash but was actually higher in 2011 than in any previous year on record. According to these estimates, in 2011 less than two fifths of all financial sector lending went to the rest of the economy. This reflects two underlying factors. Although intra-financial lending recovered significantly during 2012, the elevated share also reflects depressed total financial sector lending. A similar, albeit less volatile, pattern holds for stocks of intra-financial assets as well.
Composition of Intra-financial Lending
This section carries out a simple growth decomposition exercise to examine the main drivers of intra-financial lending in two key periods: 1983 to 1999 and 2003 to 2007. These two periods were chosen because they both witnessed large increases in intra-financial lending. The first period is meant to capture the long-term evolution of the financial sector from low interconnectedness to the high interconnectedness that characterizes the system at present, beginning with its acceleration in 1983. The second period is intended to capture changes in the financial system during the lead up to the financial crisis and to identify potential sources of financial fragility within intra-financial lending. Thus, the period begins at the trough of total intra-financial lending following the aftermath of the dotcom bubble and ends on the eve of the financial crisis. The main result that emerges from this exercise is that growth of intra-financial lending during these periods reflects two broad institutional changes in the financial system: the development of the wholesale money market and increasing securitization.
We calculate the contribution to intra-financial lending growth of each underlying instrument category as follows. Let l i,t and T t be the amount of intra-financial lending of instrument i and total intra-financial lending at time t, respectively. The contribution of each instrument to overall growth between period t 1 and period t is given by (l i,t l i,t 1 )/T t 1 . Hence, the total growth of intra-financial lending is simply the sum of the individual contributions. The next two largest contributors were federal funds and repurchase agreements, and other loans and 9 See Table A5 in the appendix for a description of the instrument series.
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Figure 5: Contributions to growth of intra-financial lending 1983-99. 
Discussion
What can we learn from our data about the broader questions about the interconnectedness of the financial sector and the social function of finance? Regarding the extent of interconnectedness or intra-financial linkages, our data suggests that interconnectedness was at a historical high immediately prior to the financial crisis and does not appear to have decreased in the years since. In fact, if we consider intra-financial lending r  o  w  t  h  2  0  0  3  -2  0  0  7  =  3  0  0  %   Total Growth 2003-2007 = 300%   T  o  t  a  l  G  r  o  w  t  h  2  0  0  3  -2  0  0  7  =  3  0  0  %  -5 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind a few important caveats. First, because our data is constructed using the FoF and not individual firm-level data, it does not capture di↵erences in the network structures of intra-financial linkages. In this sense, our data is best interpreted as providing an aggregate measure of interconnectedness capable of providing insight on broad trends and magnitudes. Second, our data does not capture other potentially important indirect links between financial institutions, such as, for instances, correlated asset and liability structures or exposures to similar shocks. Third and perhaps most importantly, since the FoF currently does not cover derivatives, our data most likely underestimates the true extent of interconnectedness.
Our work also sheds light on the question about the social function or usefulness of finance. Our data shows that since 1980 a dwindling share of credit has gone to the real economy. In other words, over the last three decades the function of finance appears to have shifted away from its traditional role of mobilizing savings and financing long-term business investment. This shift could still promote growth or be socially beneficial if, for instance, it led to increased risk sharing and optimal liquidity provision. However, as our results in the previous section shows, the growth of intra-financial lending was concentrated in financial instruments that likely contributed to systemic risk -MMMFs, Repos, and securitized products.
Related research should utilize these data on intra-financial lending to explore the impacts of such lending on the functioning of the macroeconomy. For example, does increased intra-financial lending contribute to 13 higher or lower levels of investment? (eg. Montecino and Epstein [16] ). Does greater intra-financial lending contribute to financial instability and crisis? Finally, why has intra-financial lending increased to such an extent in the US and do we observe similar trends in other countries?
Developing the data set on intra-financial lending presented in this paper is just the first step in investigating these issues. As explained above, we assume that a share alpha of each type of financial sector asset translates into liabilities for the financial sector. The share alpha is estimated as follows: let l Table A .3, below, shows the FoF code for each series used to calculate the baseline alpha shares (that is, those that include the Federal Reserve). 10 For instance, the alpha for open market paper is calculated as:
A Data Appendix
In order to remove the Federal Reserve from checkable deposits and currency, we calculate a separate alpha for Federal Reserve liabilities. This alpha equals
The amount of intra-financial assets of checkable deposits and currency were thus calculated as
In the case of net interbank transactions and federal funds and repurchase agreements it was possible to identify and therefore directly subtract Federal Reserve assets and liabilities from financial sector asset It is worth mentioning one aspect of how the instrument categories are organized. In cases when types of instruments have been securitized, the broad instrument categories include both the underlying class of asset as well as the securitized product. 11 For instance, the other loans and advances category includes both collateralized loan obligations and the underlying business loans these are based on. Similarly, the agency and GSE-backed securities category includes both the original mortgage pools as well as the resulting mortgagebacked securities. In these instances we take care to only count the instrument sub-categories that result in intra-financial claims and not those that evidently represent claims on (e.g.) households or non-financial business. Source: Authors' calculations based on the flow of funds.
